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VII. Finance & Debt · Claim under review

"Where MDB claims dominate a country's debt, restructuring cannot succeed without some MDB burden-sharing"

🏛️ What does the MDB say? — WORLDBANK 2023

"WBG opposes MDB haircuts in 2023, upholding preferred creditor status while advocating for stronger private/bilateral creditor participation and policy-driven debt sustainability."

The World Bank Group's 2023 reports acknowledge structural weaknesses in the Common Framework for debt restructuring—including delays, lack of private sector participation, and fears of financing exclusion—but do not advocate for MDBs to take haircuts or relinquish their preferred creditor status. Instead, they emphasize strengthening coordination with all creditors, improving transparency, incentivizing sustainable borrowing via policies like the Sustainable Development Finance Policy, and urging commercial and bilateral creditors (including China) to provide comparable treatment. The WBG positions itself as a catalyst for orderly, rules-based restructuring—not a loss-bearing party.

Original source quotes
📄 Global Economic Prospects, June 2023 p. 164 Open PDF ↗

"debt treatment to DSSI-eligible countries with unsus- tainable debt beyond the DSSI (IMF 2021). This Framework has been hampered by implementa- tion delays such that, by May 2023, only four countries had requested debt relief under the Framework and negotiations had stalled for several of them. One reason may be the absence of private sector participation. In addition, potential appli- cants fear their access to commercial financing will be cut off if they apply, while the slow pace and uncertainty of restructuring also deter countries from applying (Gill 2022). To improve the Common Framework, it is crucial to bring commercial creditors into the restructuring negotiations and establish a standard mathemati- cal formula for determining the size of debt relief that all creditors will provide (Rivetti 2022). In an effort to prevent the emergence of new fiscal risks, the Sustainable Development Finance Policy (SDFP) replaced the Non-Concessional Borrowing Policy (NCBP) in July 2020. The SDFP, which applies to client countries of the international development association (IDA), aims to incentiv- ize countries to move toward transparent and sustainable financing. The policy also aims to further enhance coordination between IDA and other creditors in support of the countries’ reform efforts toward sustainable development finance (World Bank 2020). While it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the SDFP, the increased debt vulnerabilities arising from the pandemic encour- aged most countries to look for ways to strengthen debt management, enhance debt transparency, and improve fiscal sustainability, supported by the SDFP (World Bank 2021, 2022f). CHAPTER 4 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS | JUNE 2023 143 11 Because of the lack of data on real exchange rate in LICs, the framework here uses “other factors” to cover the contribution from changes in real exchange rates rather than showing it as a separate component. * (1 )(1 ) 1 , (1 ) 1 t t t t s RXR + + π = + + π dollar (U.S. dollar per local currency unit) and RXRt is defined by: with RXRt > 0 denoting a real exchange rate appreciation and st denoting nominal exchange rate appreciation. The original decomposition equation is reorganized into equation (4.1.1) to form the basis for decomposing the change in public debt-to-GDP ratio into the following attributable components: (1) the primary fiscal balance net of seigniorage; (2) real GDP growth; (3) the implicit nominal interest rate; and (4) other factors.11 The last term, “other factors,” is the actual change in the debt-to-GDP ratio minus the sum of components (1) to (3). It includes privatization receipts, the real exchange rate, government support to banks and corporates or other ad hoc sources of debt. Since this accounting identity is highly nonlinear, decompositions of cumulative changes are conducted recursively comparing actual debt changes with these in counterfactuals of zero output growth, constant primary balances, zero inflation, or nominal interest rates that equal nominal GDP growth. Implicitly, this approach generates a lower bound for the contribution of inflation and growth to debt dynamics. Growth and inflation drive up revenues and, thus, narrow deficits. Narrower deficits, in turn, can lower pressures for rising government debt. This indirect effect is not"

⚖️ Academic verdict 2 peer-reviewed papers
🟡 Conditional 2
📚 Academic evidence
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